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3
EU's

COMMON FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS

RUSSIA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
Vigit Canay

INTRODUCTION

R eviewing the past few years' literature on European Union-Russian relations, one
observes that there is an increasing am ount of news, analysis and scholarly wo rk, which is
mostl y produced by Westerners. Since 9/ 11 and perhaps even before, Russia and Russian
politics have started to attract a significant aITlOunt of focus. Time Magaz ine even chose
Russian President Vladimir Putin as its " Person of the Year" for 2007(Ignatius). Major news
agencies and newspapers like Th.e Financial Tim es and Th.e BBC have started to devote
distinct sections to Russia and Putin's policies so that their audiences could easily follow
developments in Russia. H owever, unlike the Cold War era, attention directed to Russia
seems to be largely on the European rather than the American side.
There are two main reasons for this. First, US foreign policy is currently entangled in
Middle Eastern politics, Iraq, M ghanistan and the fight against terrorism, which tends to
distract attention from Russia . Second, a number of recent events, especially since 2006, have
caused more troubles between Russia and Europe rather than between Russia and the US.
D eteriorating British-Russian relations du e to Alexander Litvinenko's death in London,
several attempts by Ru ssia to cut the flow of natural gas to the Baltic States and Ukrain e,
the murder of journalist and pro-democratization advocate Anna Politokskaya, and debates
about the fairness of recent elections in Russia have all contributed to the deteriorating
relationship between Europe and Russia. As the tensions between Russia and the EU
increase and as more people start to qu estion the impact of Putin's "authoritarian rule", the
EU-Russian dialogu e gets tougher and criticism s of EU's common policies towards Russia
grow. SOlTle, like Edward Lu cas, Central and Eastern European correspondent of Th e
Economist, regards present Russian-Western relations as a " N ew Cold War"(Lucas). Others
claim that the " EU's strategy for democratizing Russia is now officially dead" (Leonard and
Popescu). So if West's, especially Europe's, image in international affairs is undermined by
the em ergence of a new Russian power, w hat is wrong with what Europe is doing? Is the
Russian-European relationship doom ed to becom e even worse? Why aren 't the conU110n
policies of Europe working as desired ?
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To gain a better understanding of the phenomena that shapes the EU-Russian
relations, this paper aims to bring an evaluation of EU-Russian relations by exploring its
past and present, and giving prescriptions for positive developments. In the first section, our
attention will be on understandin g th e nature of relations by focu sing on the
interdependency and the importan ce of geographical proximity b etween EU and Russia.
Furthermore, we will try to outline what the two sides want to see in each other. The
question we will try to answer is "what kind of EU does Russia want and vice-versa?" In
the second section, we will b e examining the topics that dominate the relationship between
the two powers, the legal and institutional structures, and the actors that are shaping the
relationship. Due to the va riety of topics that Russian-EU relations are entangled with, we
will focus the on the major areas of contention such as, markets and business, energy supply,
and politics of defense and security. Our focus on these policy areas will be followed by the
presentation and assessment of past and current legal and institutio nal structures that exist in
conducting the relations regarding the topics above. By keeping an eye on present scholarly
work, criticisms and views on the weaknesses and substance of the EU's methods in
conducting relations with Russia will be identified . We will also touch upon the roles and
characteristics of the actors in the m aking of foreign policy. In w hat ways is Moscow
influencing European policies towards Russia? How does the EU's political process fun ction
in maintaining and conducting the relationship? Who are the responsible institutions and
w ho are the influential member states or blocs? The third section will serve as a conclusion,
and present three cOlluno nly accepted strategies for the future in the market, energy and
defense sectors that are suggested for the EU to reach the goals that are defined in its past
common foreign policy preferences towards Russia.
UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between Russia and the EU is coined as "a strategic partnership
founded on conmlon interests and shared values to which both sides conunitted in the
relevant international organizations such as the UN, Council of Europe and OSCE, as well
as with each other in the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement"(European
Conunission 2). The values that both sides are particularly committed to are democracy,
human rights, the rule ofl aw, and principles of market econom y. Before moving in to debate
the values mentioned and their relevan ce to EU-Russian relations, let's look at the nature
of the relationship.
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

The European Union 's relations with Russia are more extensive than their relations
with any other country. The frequency of bilateral dialogue between the two is unique
(Schuette 1). The necessity of establishing such a unique strategic partnership is easy to
explain . Russia and the EU are incredibly interdependent on each other economicilly.
Russia is the EU's third biggest trading partner after C hina and the United States (European
Conmussion Directorate-General for External Relations 27). 2006 figures show that Russia
accounted for 6.2% of EU exports and 10% of EU imports in goods. The EU25 exported
13.1bn Euros of services to Russia, while imports of services from Russia amounted to
9.9bn , meaning that the EU25 had a surplus of 3.2bn in trade in services with Russia (Ibid.
30). Furthermore, in 2005 the net flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) betwee n the
EU25 and Russia , the EU25's FDI fl ow to Russia accounted for 9bn Euros and Russia's FDI
fl ow to the EU25 acco unted for 4.1bn Euros. While assessing this economic
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interdependency between the E U and R ussia, one sees a big increase in the level of
economic activity from 2004 to 2006 .T he primary reason for tlus is, the EU 's expansion to
Central and Eastern European states, put the EU in a more interdependent position with
Russia. M ost Russian investm ents in the fo rmer Soviet rep ublics were included in the E U 's
statistics after the integration of these states in to the E U single n1.arket structure.
Secondl y, when we look at the energy sector, the picture is similar. Russia is the
world 's largest single external supplier of oil, accounting for 30% of the E U 's total imports
and consumption. Russia also accounts for some 44% of E U 's gas imports or around 24%
of its gas consumption. T hese figures make the EU the largest consumer of Russian energy.
Russia exports 63% of its oil and 65% of its gas to the E U (European COITmussion
D irectorate- General fo r External R elations 13). In summary, as explained by the EU Energy
COITllll.issioner Andris Piebalgs, " In the energy sector, Russia n eeds Europe as much as
E urope needs Russia. T he energy that E urope buys from Russia has been one of the key
factors in Russia's econonuc revival and stable fl ows of reasonably priced energy has been
an important m otor for E urope's econonuc growth "(Aslund). All in all, the EU depends on
Russia b ecause Russia is a vital market for EU's export of goods, services and capital.
Therefore, a growing Russian economy and nliddle-c1ass are necessary for European
markets to do business with Russia and increase European profits. O n the other hand, Russia
relies on the EU because the Russian economy needs Eu ropean expertise and technology
to modernize its economy and become more competitive. T he EU is Russia's biggest
recipient of energy products, and the EU 's econonuc and industrial development is essential
fo r Russia to sell its gas and oil . M etal and energy exports account for 20% of the Russian
GOP. Witho ut a strong market like the EU, nearby and dependent on energy, Russia would
have tro uble finan cing its own development.
EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES IN RUSSIA

By keeping an eye o n the nature of the interdependent relationship explained above,
let us try to explain w hat Russia and the EU want from each o ther. What kind of Russia
does EU want to see? In the econonuc sense, the EU wa nts to see a m odernized Russian
economy integrated into the world economy. Since N ovember 2002, the EU has recognized
Russia as a " market economy" and supports her accession to the World Trade Organization
(Aslund). T he EU 's efforts to m odernize the Russian economy are based on key concepts
such as increasing transparency in business and improving the conurutment of Russia's
business and state elite to legali ty and the rule of law. Asswrung that a developing Russian
economy would attract m ore European investment and prom ote Russian ties with the
European Single M arket, the EU wants to secure its econolruc interests in Russia by
convincing Russians to follow the EU's advice to create a secure and stable business
environment for econonuc growth . A more predictable Russian economy is seen as
insurance for increasing the willingness of European investors to invest both in Russia and
its for mer areas of influence (i .e. Central Asian, and Central and Eastern European states) .
To complete her efforts to modernize the Russian econom y and create a stable path
for the development of European and Russia business and energy sectors, the EU also
defines an ideal Russia as cOITlllutted to the " COI1.U11.0n valu es". The European Union 's
strategy towards Russia underlines the importan ce of values to the EU . These values, the
principles that the EU is founded upon, are: liberty, dem ocracy, respect for human rights,
fu ndamental freedoms and the rule of law (Schuette 27) . T h e EU wants a Russia where
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economic growth and middle class development would be accompanied by political
freedoms, understanding of dem ocracy and respect for laws, so that the growing liberal
economic structure would follow the democratization process that E urope followed . In the
EU 's belief, the dem ocratization of Russia wo uld prevent Post-Soviet Russia from
resonating the characteristics of the authoritarian capitalist regimes of the past, such as
Hitler's Germany and Mussolini 's Italy. Finally, despite the EU's enlargement to the Baltic
R epublics and its surro unding of the Kaliningrad enclave, as described in the words of EU
Conunissio ner G i.inter Verheugen, " the E U is fairly conurutted not to allow new dividing
lines to be drawn in Europe"(Lynch 101). A critique of why the EU cannot achieve her
demands listed above will be attempted after we examine the institutional and the legal
fram ework that the E U utilizes to maintain her relatio ns with Russia.
RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE

As Edward Lucas and Ian Brenuner describe in detail, the failed econOiruc and social
policies of the Yeltsin era changed the Russian perception of Western assistance in aiding
Post-Soviet Russia. The "Shock Therapy" method of transforming the col1Unand economy
to a capitalist one was not as successful as it was in the C EE and brought about an extrem e
fo rm of limitless capitalism in Russia (Brenm1er 126). The rise of " oligarchs" and their elitist
rule of the Russian economic and political life further alienated the Russian public from
both Boris Yeltsin's liberal agenda and Western business support b ehind it. The 1998 crash of
the Russian finance sector created chaos in the econ omy by causing high levels of inflation
together wit a loss of confiden ce in the market(Lucas 31-33). Understanding the Russian
experience of the 1990s is important in order to understand the present Russian rule of
Putin and his like-minded ex-KGB, pro- centralization and pro-authoritarian staff, w hich is
also called "siloviki " (Illiarionov). H owever, since that requires a detailed study, let us focus
o n the Russian view of the EU in the context of Putin's rise to power and today's Russian
policies.
The Russias' self perception and their perception of their relationship with the EU
can be understood by reading the " M edium-Term Strategy for D evelopment of Relations
b etween the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)" , a document
w ritten in 1999 and presented to the EU C onmussion in Brussels by Prime Minister Putin,
as a response to the "Col1Unon Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on
Russia" (Lynch 103) .1 In its first page, w hile describing the differences between Russia and
the E U, it says: " During the period under review, partnership between Russia and the
European Union will be based on the treaty relatio ns, i.e. without an officially stated
objective of Russia 's accession to or "association" with the EO. As a world power situated
on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to deternun e and implem ent its
dom estic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of an Euro-Asian state and the largest
country of the C IS, independence of its position and acti vities at international organizations.
From this point of view, partnership with the EU can manifest itself in j oint effo rts to
establish an effective systepl of collective security in E urope on the basis of equality without
dividing lines, including throu gh the development and implem entation of the C harter on
European Security, in progress towards the creation of the Russia - European Union free
trade zone, as well as in a high level of mutual confidence and cooperation in politics and
economy".2
Based on this official statem ent contained in a legal document, Russia certainly sees
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itself as a global playe r, w hi ch is diffe rent from other former Soviet republics that seek
accession to the EU . Russia 's self-understanding sh ows that EU 's efforts to persuade Russia
to democratize itself as a Western country and m odernize its economy as the prospecti ve
E U member states we re doing is not so useful since Russia is not abided by any EU
accession criteria. The E U certainly cann ot san ction anything to influence the internal
affairs of Russia and cannot obtai n any concrete promise from the Kremlin with in regard
to bringing changes to the Russian political structure. Aware of these fac ts, Putin 's Russia
wants an EU that doesn't interfere in Russian internal affairs. In issues like political
freedoms, the rule of law and the power of the judiciary or the C hech en Confl..ict, Russia
wants the EU to b e silent. In the economic sense, R ussia wa nts to further increase her
integration with E urope, however by playing the economic game on her own terms. U nder
Putin's rule, Russia has certainly diminished the economic dominance of the oligarchs,
allocating their economic power to the central authority by creating giant state-owned
fi rm s. Centralizatio n has b ecome the dominant phenom eno n in Russian economic
development and has bro ught stability to the market by decreasing the influence of freelancing business elites that had the potential to challenge Putin 's authority. The
Khodorovsky affair is a clear example of that (Lucas 48). Today, Russia wants an econ omic
integration with Europe w hich would ben efit Russia by helping to m odernize her
economy by attracting investments but also tolerating the operation of Russian centralized
giants like the energy firm Gazprom to operate in the E U ma rket .
Furthermore, Russia wants a Europe, w hich is mo re transparent w hile fo rming
conunon policies that are related to Russia. Europe should allow Russia to become m ore
involved in the European decision-making process on questions that affect Russia's interests,
such as trade policy, anti-dumping regulations, and the precise impact of enlargem ent on
Russian goods that are expo rted to the new m ember states (Lynch 104).
In issues like security policies and the role of European Security and D efense Policy
and Conm10n Foreign Security Policy in EU-Russian relations, Russia looks favorably to
the development of both. Until NATO 's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, Russia supported the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a lever to undermi ne the
supremacy of NATO, w hich doesn't intend o n granting Russia m embership. Mter the 1999
NATO interventio n, Russia realized that O SCE 's importance, as a security organization was
not enough for Russia to gain more influence in European defense politics. Therefore,
Russia started to perceive ESDP and C FSP as initiatives that could allocate some of the
power and influence of European security policies to a purely European level by eliminating
the domi nance of the U S. Russia wants an EU where E uropeans assum e more responsibility
in forming their security p olicies by diminishing American influence, because Russia is
aware of the fact that, it can influence the European decision-making since the EU and
Russia are m ore interdependent to each other in economic terms than U S and
Russia(Lynch 107). Today, despite ESDP's perception as a m echanism to dilute NATO's
predominant role by providing an alternative locus for decision-making, increasing dialogue
between Russia and NAT O is making the assessment of Russian views on European
security policy structure harder to make.
EU-RuSSIAN RELATIONS: TOPICS, ACTORS, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In the second sectio n, this paper will summarize the topics, and the substance and
structure of the current legal framework and institutional arrangem.ents that dominate the

EU's Common Foreign Policies towards Russia

28

YIGIT CANAY

Pitzer College

EU 's policy towa rds Russia. It w ill also examine the different foreign policy making
structures and actors on b oth sides. T he conclusion w ill include a critiqu e and evaluation of
the current structure.
TOPICS

Broad topics that dominate the legal documents signed by the EU and/ or Russia are
m ostl y focused on 1) trade and economic cooperation , 2) energy, climate change and the
environment, 3) freedom , security, justice and human rights, 4) foreign policy cooperation
and external security, 5) research , educatio n and culture. These are the broad policy areas
where, E uropean and Russian j o int and unilateral initiatives try to com e up with policies
for better integratio n of each bloc. There are also specific co operation initiatives b oth from
EU and Russia that try to address the relations of the two in specifi c Russian regions such
as the Kaliningrad enclave and N orthern Caucuses (E uropean Commission DirectorateGeneral fo r External R elations) . R eturning back to the topics listed above, it can be said
that in areas like climate change, environmental regulations, research, education and cultural
exchanges there is m ore cooperation between the two since more tangible results are visible.
In terms of regional politics, cooperation between the EU and Russia in setting regulations
for the free-passage of goods and people from Russia to Kaliningrad , w hich is surro unded
by EU - member Baltic states since the 2004 EU expansion, seems to be more fruitful
compared to the lack of common understanding between the EU and Russia in adopting
conunon policies towards the N orthern Caucuses. What are the " real" issues that dominate
the EU-Russian relations?
Clearly, the weight of issues like energy security, market integration and structure,
cooperation in defense, and the EU 's emphasis on internal political developments in Russia ,
are mu ch more dominant compared to other topics. M ajor contentions and conflict of
interests occur in the debates about these issues, and the dominant literature regarding EURussian relations focuses on these aspects of the relationship since they are more
problematic and need m ore urgent solutions. T he political sensitivity of both sides to
developments and policies in the energy sector, market regulations or political freedoms in
Russia, affects the language of legal documents. In general, the wording of the clauses
adopted by between the EU and Russia is soft and weak compared to the unilateral official
statements.Therefore, while evaluating the current legal structures and actors responsible for
conducting the relationship, we will focus on issues like energy, market and defense.
ACTORS AND METHODS

Actors and m ethods in foreign policy-making are largely different in the EU and
Russia. Russia, which has under go ne an increased centralization in the Putin era , depends
mostly on the central govermnent's views and perceptions in foreign policy-making.
M embers of the new political elite, w h o occupy stro ng positions in the executive boards of
the state owned giant companies, are responsible fo r Russia's foreign policy decisions
regarding the markets, security and energy. As Dimitri Trenin explains, the consolidatio n of
the control of money in fewer hands has made the elite stronger in easily utilizing the power
of capital to increase its business interests. The unofficial slogan has now b ecome "What is
good for Gazprom is good for Russia" (Trenin 95). As this new " bureaucratic capitalist" class
has gained more confidence, it has become relu ctant to share the power of decision making
with the opposition groups and the responsiveness of the state has declined .
The new elite's m ain method of dealing with the EU is " divide and rule". Du e to a
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broad lack of the weak level of conun on policy understanding at the European level , Russia
capitalizes on EU 's internal divisions by preferring to deal with EU member-states
separately rather than faci ng them as a group. Especially in the energy sector, Russia feels
confident in sealing bilateral energy deals with countries with higher levels of Russian gasdependen cy like France and Germany and plays them against the Russia-skeptics hke
Poland and the Baltic States (Trenin 98). Furthermore, " desperate for energy access and
profits it brings, E uropean energy compani es are played agai nst each other by the Kremlin
in o rder to secure more adva ntageous conditions for Russia" (Baran 133) . As a result,
Russia's record on the adoption of European common values has becom e less questioned as
pragm atic economic interests dominate the political agenda.
Unlike heavily presidential and business-oriented fore ign pohcy making in Russia, in
the EU decision-making is a complex process. "Dispersal of the decision-making power
am ong different institutions affects the EU's ability to interact strategically with M oscow.
EU is som ething with divided institutions, unclear sovereignty, a weak sense of conmlon
interests, and few institutions in political arena that are independentl y to achieve the EU's
declared ends" (Lynch 11 2). Different from Russia's emphasis on sovereignty, the EU's
emphasis is on unity of views on "conunon values" . A conmlo n policy towards Russia over
a longer term is harder for the EU as change in the institutions running the E U (i.e. Council
of Ministers, European Council and EU Presidency) is more fre quent compared with the
corresponding Russian institutions. M ost of the time, EU business interests shows a
preference for short- term stability in EU-Russian affairs and that diminish es the political
will of the EU leaders in bringing a m ore substantive and radical change to the natu re of
the relationship. Finally, in the crowded EU 27, the divided perceptions and views of Russia
make it even harder for EU sunmuts to produce genuin e solutions or proposals to m ore
effectively deal w ith Russia. For example, w hile states like Germany, w hich badly need
energy, want to utilize less provocative methods against Russia, others like " the Russiaskeptics" (i.e., Britain, the Czech R epublic) and " the N ew Cold Warriors" (i .e., Poland and
Lithuania) are reluctant to continue the relationship with Russia in its current form, which
undernunes the EU's power (Leonard and Popescu 2).
A COMPLEX AND GROWING STRUCTURE
T he legal and institutional fram ework of the EU-Russian relations started with the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreem ent (PCA) that was signed in 1994 and cam e in to
fo rce in 1997 w ith an initial duration of 10 yea rs. The PC A aimed to bring about
cooperation of the two in various topics including the maj or ones listed above. It established
the following institutional arrangem ents to reach its goals: 1) E U-Russia slllmmts, where the
Russian President and the EU troika m eet twice a year; 2) Perma nent Partnership Council
(PPC), aimed to allow Ministers (i.e. Ministers of energy, foreign affairs, enviromne nt)
responsible for various policy areas to meet as often as necessary to deal with specific issues
discussed at the sumnut m eetings; 3) Cooperation Conmuttee in w hich EU Conm u ssion
and senior-level Russian officials m eet; 4) The Parliam entary Cooperation Conmuttee,
which aims to increase the exchan ge of views between MPs. Political dialogue between
Russia and the EU also takes place in the format of contacts between the Russian
diplomatic Imssion in Brussels and EU officials, and expert m eetings in C FSP formations
(Schuette 2).
The second legal document was the " C onunon Strategy on Russia" (C S), adopted by
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:

EU's Common Foreign Policies towards Russia

30

VIGil CANAY Pitzer College

the EU in 1999 and expired in 2004. Although a unilateral document, it was public and
aimed to increase the coherence of foreign policy understanding towards Russia among the
EU member states. As a response to CS, as previously mentioned above, Russia formed its
" Russian Mediul1l-Term Strategy on EU Relations" in 1999 for duration of 10 years. With
the maturation of the three pillars of the EU as well as the EU-Russian relationship, EURussian relations started to categorized as "Common Spaces" as explained in the "Four
Conmlon Spaces for EU and Russia ".3 This structure was adopted in 2003 in the St.
Petersburg EU-Russia Sunurut. In 2005 , the roadmaps to implement the short and medium
term goals of the "Conullon Spaces" were adopted. The Conunon Spaces are : 1) The
Conunon Economic Space; 2) The Common Space of Freedom , Security and Justice ; 3) The
Common Space of External Security; and 4) The Conul1on Space of Research and
Education, including Cultural Aspects.
Although there area a lots of technical details regarding the " Conmlon Spaces" and
the areas they address, a number of significant points are notable. First, although Germany
and France introduced "Conunon Spaces" , the Conmussion and the Council Secretariat,
rather than the individual member states, has done most of the substantial work(Schuette 4).
Second, major econOiruc aims are the diversification of Russia 's non-energy related exports
to Europe as well as securing Europe's energy supply by creating an environment of
confidence and fair relations with the Russian energy sector. In the political field , the EU
has pursued two types of dialoglJe with Russia : international issues, including regional
conflicts; and Russian internal affairs and Russia conurutment to the "conml0n European
values". In the former, the EU found that it is easier to come to tenns with Russia in
addressing international issues like nuclear proliferation or the fight against terrorism.
However, in the issues directly involving Russia such as political freedoms in the country or
regional conflicts in the territories of the Federation, the EU realized that it is harder to
engage Russia. Furthermore, regarding the issues related with the former areas of Russian
influence in Europe, the EU has seen that by engaging Russia in an intensive dialogue in
the framework of ESOp, the EU could achieve what it wanted without an increase in
Russian aggressiveness (Schuette 7-9). In the "Conunon Space on Security and Home
Affairs", the EU again found a Russia which is reluctant to cooperate and agree with the
EU in the adoption of common values of freedom such as: independent media, human
rights, the role of civil society and democracy. However, in the issues related with justice and
security affairs, the EU cooperated with Russia in a majority of areas like, the fight against
illegal activities, migration, money laundering, trafficking of drugs and humans and
organized crime.
As observed above, perhaps the most severe problem in the Russian-EU relationship
is getting Russian conurutment to the values of the EU in an honest way. The EU wants to
see some practical evidence in Russian political life regarding its development as a prodemocratic liberal regime. However, despite EU's repetition of the concept of" conunon
values" in every occasion, there is little progress on the Russian side. Certainly, the soaring
oil and gas prices and the Russian econOiruc revival beginning in 2000s have encouraged
Kremlin to create an alternative to the democratic liberal capitalist model pursu ed by the
West. This new " illiberal capitalism" adopted new approaches for understanding the role of
sovereignty, state power and central authority in the development of markets (Raclunan).
However, despite the growing confidence of Russian politicians in their financial and
econonuc development, there was a problem in the EU's conunon foreign policy-making
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system as well that did not help the EU to achieve her aims.

A CRITIQUE
Rolf Schuette, a senior German diplomat specialized in Russian affairs, is someone
who presents a comprehensive account of what the EU did wrong while integrating
"conullon values" to its foreign policy-making and why the desired level of effectiveness in
influencing Russia couldn't be achieved by the EU First, PCAs, which were initially
adopted by Russia and later on by other former Soviet Republics, differed significantly in
wording. The EU used a more effective language in convincing the CEE countries to
embrace the "conunon values of Europe". Furthennore, to increase their compliance with
the EU's advice and policy directions, the EU promised the CEE states membership in the
EU. However, "even if only a partner, Russia was expected to become like a Western
European democracy, without being offered the prospect of full-fledged membership of the
family of Western European democracies" (Schuette 15). Second, the CS was a document
that aimed to "test the efficiency of the new EU mechanisms in developing and activating
a new CFSP instrument. As such, the contents of the CS were not the primary focus"
(Schuette 16). Since it was a unilateral docmnent and since its content was not something
planned, but something that combined specific ideas that member states came up with, it
failed to get Russia to abide by it. Furthermore, it failed to become a blueprint that can be
used by member states in formulating their national foreign policies towards Russia, since
its conclusions lacked the unified political will of all European leaders.
Third, the unilateral adoption of the CS encouraged the Russian leadership to adopt
the MTS in a similar way. The MTS, a document that came as a response to the CS,
challenged Europe's vision of Russia by using an opposite approach and language. Russia
now showed the fundamental difference between herself and the EU by not placing any
significant emphasis on human rights or democracy in the document. Russia answered the
question of "what the partnership should be based upon?" While the EU was pushing
forward for the incorporation of "common values" in the EU-Russian agenda, Russia
declared that she was not seeking EU membership, and therefore, her political system did
not have to be the same as other EU member states (Schuette 18). Fourth, the results,
language and significance of joint statements of sUIllinit meetings usually vary due to the
different political agenda and envirorunent surrounding them. Therefore, it is hard to
describe the outcomes of sununits as a general achievement for increasing the EU-Russian
relations. However, it is true that the high-level nature of meetings made them beneficial for
parties to understand each other's demands by getting into face-to-face dialogue.
Finally, few documents were produced in 2004 the year EU expansion dominated the
political agenda of the EU-Russian relations (European Conunission) . EU Conunission
published a conununication to be delivered to The General Affairs and External Relations
Council of EU (GAC) and EU Parliament. The Conullission's conununication measured
the assessment of EU-Russian relations and its content was adopted by the GAC that
followed. Later on, after the 13th EU-Russia Sununit, both parties published a "Joint
Statement on E.U. Enlargement and E.U.- Russian Relations".4 As, Schuette notes down,
the significant thing about both documents is, they didn't significantly include the conunon
European values, or any strong reference to previous legal agreements. Rather than
formulating its hopes and demands toward Russia as a precondition for developing the
strategic partnership, EU started to perceive the partnership as a mean to achieve the goals
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and adoption of common values (Schuette 22-24). Perhaps due to the sensitive political
environment that expansion created or perhaps due to problematic EU-US relations and the
EU 's failed attempt to derive a common foreign policy due to Iraq War, the EU seemed to
lack the confidence she earlier had in using a powerful language against Russia.
All in all, to close tlus debate abo ut common values and their relevance to EU's
conunon foreign policy towards Russia, it can be said that, in the context of dense and
complex structure of legal and institutional framework , which tries to address a growing
number of issues everyday, it is hard for the EU to come up with a clear strategy to make
Russia to conunit itself to all of the European values embraced by an ideal Western
democracy. Therefore, before continuing this same strategy, which obviously not effective
enough to make Russia more responsive to European demands by keeping an eye on the
recent developments just took place during the last parliamentary and presidential elections,
EU should come up with a preference of strategies that she has to follow to change the
image of EU in the relationship as the weak partner against the authoritarian and powerful
Russia.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? : CONCLUSION AND SOME ADVICE

Synthesizing w hat is presented and argued above, there are three fundamental
problems in EU's conunon foreign policy towards Russia. First, in business, despite EURussian business interests are beconung more and more interdependent, lack of a single
voice in wording the EU's conunon business interests vis-a-vis growing power of Russian
state owned giants is causing EU's market policies regarding Russia to be unpredictable. The
EU wants to set up regulations regarding the market and create a more stable economic
environment by trying to influence Russia to change its understanding of internal politics,
ill the light of European C01111110n values. However, EU 's long term ideals about Russia fails
to bring short-term benefits and that creates more confidence in Russian side while
adopting her " illiberal capitalist" approach to European markets. A sensible short-term goal
for the EU should be, as noted above in the arguments made at in the end of legal an
institutional framework section, choosing the preferred conml0n values that EU wants
Russia to apply inunediately to increase the level of confidence in the relationship. That
preferred value should be " rule oflaw" (Leonard and Popescu 3). Although EU's long-term
goal should be promotion of a liberal democracy in Russia , EU has to focus on the
application of rule of law in the first place to prevent the complete failure of the aims
outlined in the past legal documents, which are largely not applied . Rule oflaw, would bring
both reliability to business and political relations between the two group.
Second, in the energy sector, being highly dependent on Russian energy supply
undernunes Europe's efforts to foster the ideals of pro-democratic good governance
envisaged in CFSP Member states became far more reluctant to cede sovereignty to Brussels
on energy policy since they want to secure their energy supplies from Russian by making
bi-Iateral deals (Baran 140). Therefore to solve this problem, the EU's strategy of decreasing
the Russian impact on energy could follow a sin1ilar one proposed by Baran. On the focus
of EU's strategy there should be two aims: 1) diversifying the EU's energy resources and 2)
ainung to reach alternative oil and gas suppliers. Despite Russia's efforts to increase the
number of pipelines that will transport Russian oil and gas to the heart of EU (i.e. NorthStream and South-Stream Projects) , the EU should seek alternative pipeline routes to
connect European energy market to Caspian oil and gas resources (The Econonust) . That
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strategy should also include, increasing the EU's efforts to engage in more diplomatic and
business relations with the Central Asian resource rich republics, whose energy markets are
currently dominated by Russia. Furthermore, if the EU wants to act in her current legal
framework to deal with the Russian energy giants and their unfavorable business activities,
the EU should not fear from using her antitrust policies to prosecute the monopolistic
structures of these firms to regulate their behavior in the EU market (Baran 140) . If
sanctioning the giant German and French energy companies yield positive results,
Conunission can use the antitrust regulations against the Russian finns as well. This kind of
approach will also further strengthen the EU's firmness in showing the importance of the
rule of law to Russia.
Third problem is in the area of defense. Although there are lots of promises in the legal
documents to improve the common understandings of Russia and the EU regarding the
ESDP and CFSP initiatives, there is a lack of practical results. Both sides promise to
cooperate in the international defense sector however; there is no joint security force in the
ground that consists of both Europeans and Russians. The solution can be, as Dov Lynch
explains, forming a joint security and conflict settlement initiative in Moldova's problematic
Ukrainian border zone (Transdniestria), where separatist movements undermine the
political stability of the region. Sharing responsibility and conull.itment in fonning a joint
structure in conflict management and temporary constitutional settlements, Russia and EU
could show an effort under the context of ESDP and OSCE (Lynch 116) . That kind of
strategy would make Russia to feel like, she is able to be a part of European defense and
security initiatives if she starts participating to cooperate with Europe better than before.
Placing a modest whose strategic force which's resources and personnel supplied by both
Russia and the EU on Moldova, would help the EU in the future to engage Russia in
bringing clarification and solutions to conunon foreign policy views on the future of states
like Georgia, Ukraine and the rest of Balkans.
END NOTES

1. Official document of Conunon Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on
Russia can be accessed at
<http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relationsl ceecal com_ strati russia_99 .pdf>
2. An unofficial English translation of Medium-Term Strategy for Development of
Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)
can be accessed at European Commission web portal at
<http://ec.europa .eul external_relations I russia I russian_medium_term_strategy I>
3. The detailed framework of the Four ConmlOn Spaces for EU and Russia was outlined
in the EU-Russia Summit in The Hague in 25 November and a copy of that
framework could be reached through EU Conunission's web portal at
< http: //ec.e uropa.eu /externaLrelations/ russia /sununic11_04 / m04_268 .htm> .
4. "Joint Statement on E .U. Enlargement and E.U.- Russian Relations" was published in
27/0312004 can be accessed through
<http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relationsl russia I russia_docs /js_elar~270404 .hun>
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